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"FAIR" INDIRECT MAJORITY RULES
Guillermo Owen
Consider a situation in which n members of a group are asked to
determine whether a proposition is true or false. We shall assume, for
Bayesian purposes, that the a priori probability of truth or falsehood is
1/2. Moreover we assume that each individual has a probability p > 1/2
of giving a correct answer (and that this p is the same for all). The
question is whether there would be any reason to use other than a
straightforward majority rule for this purpose.
As an example, consider the case n = 5. Straightforward majority
rule means that the group will accept as correct the opinion of any three
of them.
Suppose, however, that three of the members show a strong positive
correlation in their judgments; the other two decide independently. In
that case, it is not too difficult to see that, for sufficiently high
correlation among the first three, a positive 3-2 vote (pitting the
first three against the other two) should not give rise to a positive
group judgment; in fact the two negative votes represent two negative bits
of information, whereas the three positive votes might represent as little
as one positive bit.
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The above decision rule is, of course, not "fair": the three first
decision-makers are treated worse than the other two. Unless there is
reason to expect this type of behavior on the part of the group members,
this decision rule might be open to serious (e.g., constitutional)
objections.
There are t however, "fair" group decision rules which are not direct
majority rules. ("Fair" means, in mathematical terms, that the winning
coalitions allow a transitive group of permutations over the set of all
individual voters.) The best known such rule would be the indirect
majority decision rule : the group of n members is divided into m
subgroups with n/m members each; each subgroup decides by majority vote
among its n/m members, and the entire group decides' by a majority of
the m subgroups.
Whether such a rule is more efficient (i.e., is more probably correct)
than straightforward majority rule will depend on the voting correlations
among the several individuals. Let us therefore consider the following
model. Each of the m subgroups has a "Group spirit" (possibly a group
leader) which makes a decision; these m decisions each have probability
p of being correct, and they are independent. Now each of the k members
of the j subgroup will either (1) with probability a-, follow
his leader, or (2) with probablity 1 - a-, make an independent
decision, which also has probability p of being correct. According to
this model, two members of the same (j tn ) subgroup make correlated
2decisions, with correlation a- ; members of two different subgroups act
independently. Each member has probability p of being right. The number
8476D - OWEN/Lillian H*VH * ltefttf?y
it 001
a- (0 <_ a- <_1) represents, somehow, the "charisma" of the group leader,
or the cohesiveness of the group.
In this model, it might seem that, for sufficiently high values of the
a-, the indirect majority rule could be better than the direct majority
rule. In fact, however, for equal values of a- this is usually not
so. For, as an example, suppose we have a group with three subgroups (of
equal size). Assume subgroup 1 votes 80% positive, while subgroups 2 and 3
both vote 60% negative. In this case, the groups divide 2-1 negative,
but the individual vote is 53% positive. It turns out that the "most
likely" interpretation is that the common value of the a-'s is near
0.4; the group leaders have voted 2-1 negatively, but the independently
voting members are voting positively, 2-1. Thus the weight of the evidence
is positive.
Let us suppose, however, that the a. are not all equal.
"Fairness" requires that the several subgroups be treated equally, but we
can do this by assuming that the a- are drawn independently from an
J
identical distribution—perhaps a uniform distribution over the unit
interval. (The interpretation is that each group has a leader, but some
leaders turn out to be more charismatic than others.) In this
interpretation, the heavy positive voting in subgroup 1 seems to mean that
its leader is yery popular, i.e., a-, is yery high while o^ and
ou are low.
Let us see how this works. There are essentially two possibilities:
the proposition is either true or false.
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(1) The proposition is true. Then the group leader for subgroup 1 is
2
right and the other two are wrong. The probability of this is pq .




0^ + pO-c^) = c^q + p
(where q = 1-p) while the fractions S2 and S3 voting positively
will be
Sj= (l-a.|)p (j = 2,3).
This gives us densities 1/q for s-, , and 1/p for So and s3 , all




pq /qp = q/p < 1.
(2) The proposition is false. Similar reasoning tells us that the
joint density is p/q > 1.
Assuming a uniform Bayesian prior, then, the posterior distribution
2
assigns probability s p—j to case (2): the proposition is false. This
P + q
is greater than 1/2 (since p > q); thus the indirect majority rule
gives a better result than the direct majority rule.
More generally, suppose we have a division of a group into subgroups.
Instead of an "indirect majority rule" such as described above, we might
consider as rule which assigns a certain number of points, either positive
or negative, to the result within each group, depending on the number of
positive and negative votes within the group. In other words, we would
have
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where n- is the number of indidviduals in subgroup j. and k. the
J J
number of these voting affirmatively in that subgroup. Then the whole
group will accept the proposition if
m
W = I w
J-l J
is positive, and reject if W < 0.
The simpliest case, of course, is given by w. = 2k. - n-: it
corresponds to direct majority rule. The indirect majority rule is given
by
1 if 2k. > n.
3 J
gjdijjcj)- {-i 2kj<nj
2k. = n . .
J J
Other rules may however be used: we would expect simply that g.
J
be monotone as a function of k. for each n ., and (for symmetry) that
J J
g .(n .,k .) = -g .(n .,n .-k .)
.
b
J J' J V 3 3 3
n
i
We might also ask that g. be concave in k. for k . > -**
,
although that is not strictly necessary.
It remains to see how the rules g. should be chosen.
J
To see how this can be done, let us assume that, in a given subgroup
each individual has probability p of a correct vote, and that the voting
correlations among the several individuals are maintained constant. In
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that case, a given configuration, A, of correct votes has a probability
H»(p), and the complementary configuration has probability H«(l-p)
of occurring. The conditional probability that a positive vote is
correct, given that the configuration A voted positive, is then
H
A (p)











A (p) + HA (l-p)
The weight to be given to such a configuration is then
# M , P(poslA)w{A) = l09 KnegiA)
or consequently






where c is a constant of proportionality.
Suppose, now, that p is slightly greater than 1/2: p = 1/2 + r,
where r is small. These are generally the interesting cases, as they
represent situations where opinion will likely be closely divided. We
have then
cw(A) = log H
A









• i±\ /u t±so that w(A) should be chosen proportional to H^(4)/H
A (-^)
. To
determine the constant of proportionality we note that, if the subgroup
reduces to a single individual, there is only one possible configuration,
and we will have










to a positive vote by the subset A, with negative votes by the
complementary subset.
Suppose, now, that a group with N individuals is divided into m
subgroups, with n-piipj •••> n individuals respectively. We assume once
again that all individuals have equal probability p of voting correctly.
Suppose that in a given subgroup, with n members, k of them vote
affirmatively, while the remaining n-k vote negatively. Assuming an
index a of correlation (as discussed above), the probability that










where q = 1-p, 6 = 1-a. This can be rewritten as
h(p;a) = pq"' ' (p + qa) (l-a)
n ~ v
+ qp (1-a) (q + pa)
n "
If a is known this can be evaluated directly, as can its
derivative. Suppose, however, that a is assumed distributed according
to the density function f(a), < a < 1. Then we would set
H(p) = f h(p;a) f(a) da
JO
.1
and this may or may not be easy to evaluate, depending on the form of f
We will consider here the one-parameter family of distributions
f(a) = (v+l)(l-a)
V
< a < 1
where v > -1 is a parameter. We would then have






Jl (l-a) k+V (q+pa) n
' k
da .
The change of variables u = p + qa transforms this to







i j.1 ^ -v-1 f / 1 \k+ v n-k+ (v+1) qp I (1-u) u du .
J a
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(v+l)(vp+l) f n >k+v n-k






» q + p q
Evaluating at p = 1/2, we will have












n l"2>) " (v+l)(v+2)2
J
[u (1-u) - (1-u) u J du









w = (v+2) —y -y-




Students of probability will of course recognize the integrals in this
last expression as the incomplete beta function, defined as
B(a,b) = f u a
' ] (l-u) b_1 du
q Jo
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1/2 (n-k+v+l,k+l) + B1/2 (k+v+l,n-k+l)
Unfortunately, the incomplete beta function is not extensively
tabulated. For small values of n, it is of course possible to evaluate
the integrals directly (analytically) as the integrands reduce to
polynomials of degree n. For large values of n, the integrals must be
evaluated numerically, though certain approximations, related to the normal
distribution function are also available [Abramowitz & Segun, 1964].
It is not too difficult to see that, if k is considerably larger
than n/2, then w will approach v+2 asymptotically; clearly w <_ v+2
at all times. We note that the parameter v can be taken as, in some
sense, a measure of the subgroup's a priori independence: large values of
v mean that a will tend to be small, and vice-versa. Thus if v is
large, a large margin for one or the other possibilities is given
relatively heavy weight— coming as it does from individuals who tend to
choose independently.
As an example, consider the case of a group divided into subgroups of
15 individuals each. The Table 1, shows values of the functions
w, = g(15,k ; v)
for 8 <_ k <_ 15 and v = 0,1,2. As may be seen, for v = 2, an 8-7
margin should be weighed 0.6, while a 9-6 margin is weighed 1.7 --not
quite three times as much as an 8-7 edge. As k increases to 15, the
weight approaches, but never quite reaches, the limiting value v+2 = 4.
Similar considerations may be seen throughout the table.
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TABLE 1
n = 15
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